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Abstract: The supervision of bank liquidity has been one of the core topics in the recently 
developed regulatory framework of banks (Basel III). This paper investigates two issues that 
have not been addressed in Basel III and which are of particular importance for the attainment 
of a more effective liquidity regulation. The first is the need for a dynamic definition of 
liquidity that takes into account the time-varying liquidity and stability of banks’ balance 
sheet items. The paper develops a new liquidity ratio that explicitly considers this changing 
nature of liquidity, by assigning weights that depend on financial risks and perceptions. The 
ratio is estimated and assessed for the EMU-12 countries. The second issue is the need for 
macro fragility-related liquidity requirements. We provide empirical evidence which suggests 
that the banking sector does not self-impose such requirements. Based on this evidence, it is 
argued that the regulatory agents should introduce a positive link between bank liquidity and 
macroeconomic fragility. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The imprudent management of bank liquidity has been one of the core factors that 
contributed to the 2007-8 financial distress. When the crisis unfolded, various banks 
exhibited a fragile liquidity position by having a high exposure to short-term funding, 
even though their capital buffers were at a sufficient level (see e.g. BCBS, 2010a; 
Ayadi et al., 2012; Bonfim and Kim, 2012). The reversal in the liquidity of the 
interbank market induced them to resort to the fire-sale of assets, transforming their 
illiquidity problems into insolvency ones. The overall result was the destabilisation of 
the financial system and the macroeconomy. 
 
These crisis developments have induced important changes in the regulatory 
framework of banks. Basel III has introduced two liquidity indices, with the aim to 
better supervise the liquidity of the financial system (see BCBS, 2010a). By imposing 
certain minimum limits in these indices, the new regulatory framework intends to 
contribute to the monitoring of both the short-term and the medium- to long-term 
liquidity of banks.  
 
Even though the explicit consideration of liquidity measures in Basel III is an 
important step towards a more effective supervision of the banking sector, there are 
still many issues that remain to be addressed in the field of liquidity regulation. This 
paper focuses on two of them. The first is the need for a more dynamic definition of 
liquidity. In the current regulatory framework the weights assigned to banks’ assets 
and liabilities are predetermined and do not adjust according to the conditions in the 
related financial markets. This is quite problematic since the liquidity and the stability 
of a balance sheet item is likely to be time-varying as a result of changes in risk 
perceptions and financial conditions (see e.g. Ayadi et al., 2012). A characteristic 
example is the liquidity of the government bonds. In Basel III government bonds are 
assigned a static weight equal to 0.05. This implies that in the aftermath of the EMU 
sovereign crisis all government bonds continue to be treated as highly liquid, despite 
the substantial deterioration in their liquidity profile. To address the issue of time-
varying liquidity this paper puts forward a dynamic liquidity ratio in which the 
weights of the balance sheet items adjust to their time specific liquidity and stability 
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properties. The suggested ratio is applied to EMU-12 economies and is compared with 
the static ratio introduced by Basel III. 
 
The second issue refers to the link between bank liquidity and macroeconomic risk. In 
Basel III, the minimum liquidity requirements are invariant to the fragility of the 
macro system. From the macroprudential point of view this is problematic: higher 
(lower) perceived macro risk should be accompanied by a higher (lower) bank 
liquidity. The reason is twofold. First, higher liquidity requirements in periods of 
increasing macro fragility restrict banks’ liquidity creation; the latter tends to rise in 
periods of financial euphoria amplifying instability trends.
1
 Second, a more liquid 
banking sector can more adequately absorb the shocks that may stem from a more 
fragile macroeconomy. In this paper we provide econometric evidence which shows 
that in most EMU countries the bank liquidity does not increase when the 
macroeconomic fragility becomes higher. This calls for the imposition of macro 
fragility-related minimum liquidity requirements. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops our dynamic liquidity ratio and 
applies it to EMU-12 countries. Section 3 presents the econometric evidence for the 
link between bank liquidity and macroeconomic risk. Section 4 concludes and sets out 
the policy implications of the analysis.  
 
2. The Dynamic Net Stable Funding Ratio: Definition and application 
 
2.1 Definition 
 
The liquidity of a bank expresses its ability to meet contractual liability obligations 
and to fund asset positions without significant cost.
2
 This ability depends positively 
on (a) the degree of liquidity of its assets and (b) the proportion of stable liabilities in 
total liabilities. An asset is perceived to be more liquid when it has a low credit and 
market risk. The credit risk is related with the possibility of borrower’s default; a 
                                                 
1
 There is evidence that bank liquidity follows a counter-cyclical pattern, being excessively low when 
the economy expands and excessively high when the economy shrinks (see Aspachs et al., 2004; 
Acharya et al., 2011).  
2
 For a detailed definition of the concept of liquidity and its macroeconomic implications see e.g. 
Minsky (1986), Davidson (2002), BCBS (2008, 2010a) and Nikolaou (2009). 
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default can lead to the loss of expected inflows that come from loan repayments and 
interest income. The market risk is associated with the possibility that an asset will be 
liquidated at an unfavourable price in the related market. A liability is conceived to be 
stable when it provides a long-term funding and it is not expected to be liquidated by 
banks’ borrowers in financial distress conditions. Overall, the higher the amount of 
stable liabilities relative to the amount of less liquid assets the better the liquidity 
position of a bank.      
 
In line with this general framework, in Basel III the liquidity position of banks in the 
medium to long term is captured by the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), which is 
given by the ratio of the Available amount of Stable Funding (ASF) to the Required 
amount of Stable Funding (RSF). The ratio is written as: 
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where jsw  is the static weight of liability j, isw  is the static weight of asset i , jtSL  is 
the stock of liability j in time t and itSA  is the stock of asset i in time t. According to 
formula (1), the ASF is defined as the weighted sum of the stock of liabilities that are 
deemed stable. The greater the weight assigned to a liability the more stable this 
liability is conceived. The RSF is calculated as the weighted sum of the stock of assets 
that are less liquid and must be supported with stable funding. The greater the weight 
applied to an asset the more this asset needs to be supported with stable funding. 
Given that holding more stable liabilities relative to illiquid assets improves the 
medium- to long-term liquidity of banks, a higher NSFR is desirable. 
 
Table 1 shows how NSFR is estimated in this paper. The static weight of each asset 
and liability is calculated following broadly the approach of BCBS (2010a). Since this 
ratio is going to be applied to EMU countries, the assets and the liabilities have been 
categorised according to the classification of balance sheet data provided by the 
European Central Bank (ECB); see Appendix A for the detailed aggregated balance 
sheet of euro area monetary financial institutions (MFIs). 
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On the liability side, capital and reserves are deemed more stable and thereby a weight 
equal to 1 is assumed. Moreover, deposits with agreed maturity and debt securities 
issued for longer than one year are classified as equally stable. Deposits of monetary 
financial institutions, deposits of central government, external liabilities and overnight 
deposits are regarded less stable than the other deposits. Hence, the former are 
assigned a weight of 0.8 while the latter are assigned a weight of 0.9. All the other 
liabilities are given a zero weight. On the asset side, securities other than shares issued 
by the government in the euro area constitute the most liquid asset, after cash and 
loans to monetary financial institutions, with a weight equal to 0.05. Loans are 
classified according to their type. We consider loans for house purchase as more 
liquid since they are backed by collateral, assigning a weight of 0.65. For other loans 
to households, for loans to non-financial corporations and for external assets, which 
tend to be less liquid, a higher weight equal to 0.85 is assigned. The rest of the assets 
have a weight equal to 1. 
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Table 1: Balance sheets weighting used to calculate the NSFR 
Basel III category Liability Weight
Tier 1 and 2 capital instruments Capital and reserves 1
Deposits with agreed maturity greater than 1 year 1
Debt securities issued for longer than 1 year 1
Deposits with agreed maturity up to 1 year 0.9
Deposits redeemable at notice 0.9
Repurchase agreements 0.9
Overnight deposits 0.8
Deposits of monetary financial institutions 0.8
Deposits of the central government 0.8
External liabilities 0.8
All other liabilities All other liabilities 0
Basel III category Asset Weight
Cash - 0
Loans to MFIs (e.g. interbank) Loans to monetary financial institutions 0
Sovereign securities Holdings of securities other than shares issued by general 
government in the euro area
0.05
Mortgages Lending for house purchase 0.65
Retail loans Loans to non-financial corporations 0.85
Loans to households excluding  lending for house purchase 0.85
External assets 0.85
All other assets All other assets 1
Available amount of Stable Funding (ASF )
Required amount of Stable Funding (RSF )
Other liabilities with an effective maturity of 
one year or greater
Stable deposits with residual maturity less than 
a year
Less stable deposits with residual maturity less 
than a year
Source: Based on BCBS (2010a) 
 
One important feature of NSFR is that the weights of balance sheet items are static. 
This is quite problematic since in the real world financial system the liquidity of 
assets and the stability of liabilities change continuously due to time-varying market 
conditions, financial perceptions and perceived risks. For example, as Minsky (1986) 
has pointed out, in tranquil years economic agents’ required margins of safety become 
lower due to the widespread euphoria; hence, the credit and the market risk are 
perceived to be low (see also Kregel, 1997). The opposite holds in a period that 
follows a financial episode in which the perceived risks are high and the stability of 
banks’ liabilities declines, due to the generalised increase in economic agents’ 
liquidity preference. Attention should also be drawn to the fact that a market can 
rapidly turn from a liquid into an illiquid one if, for some reason, many investors try 
to liquidate their assets at the same time. This is a common feature of financial 
distress situations.  
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This dynamic nature of financial markets and financial behaviours brings forward the 
need for a more dynamic definition of liquidity. In this paper this is done by allowing 
the balance sheet weights in NSFR to be a function of the interest rates that 
correspond to the assets and liabilities under investigation. On the asset side, the 
interest rates can be used as proxies for the perceived credit and market risk. A higher 
interest rate is broadly associated with a higher risk premium and, thus, with less 
liquid assets. On the liability side, a high interest rate implies that banks’ lenders are 
not very willing to provide the required funding. Hence, they are more prone to 
withdraw their liabilities in a stress event.    
 
In the estimation of the dynamic balance sheet weights the interest rates are compared 
with a benchmark interest rate. The benchmark interest rate expresses the interest rate 
that corresponds to the safest and most liquid lending for banks, as this is determined 
by the monetary policy. The higher the spread between the interest rate of an asset and 
the benchmark interest rate the less liquid this asset is considered. Furthermore, a high 
spread between the interest rate of a liability and the benchmark interest rate implies 
that banks are willing to foregone their profitability in order to obtain funding from 
this type of liability. Thus, the higher this spread the more banks need to compensate 
the potential borrowers in order to convince them to become less liquid. This 
corresponds to cases of less stable funding. In our analysis, the EONIA interest rate 
has been used as the benchmark interest rate. The EONIA interest rate refers to the 
interbank lending and is greatly affected by the ECB policy rate.  
 
Adopting this approach, the time-varying weight of asset i in time t  ittw  is estimated 
via the following formula:
3
   
 
 ititiiit rbraswtw                                                                                              (2) 
 
where 0ia  is the responsiveness of the time-varying weight to the interest rate 
spread of asset i; the interest rate spread of asset i is defined as the difference between 
                                                 
3
 For simplicity, a linear function has been assumed.  
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the interest rate of asset i in period t  itr  and the corresponding benchmark interest 
rate  itrb .  
 
Note that 0ia  when the time-varying weight is not perceived as necessary to be 
different than the static weight. When the parameter ia  is positive, it is estimated by 
defining a period maximum value for the time-varying weight: 
 
dswtw ii )max(                                                                                                       (3) 
 
where d is a positive number that is added to the static weight when the dynamic 
weight takes its maximum value. It holds that: 
 
)max()max( iiiii rbraswtw                                                                                (4) 
 
Combining expressions (3) and (4), we get: 
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Following the same logic, the time-varying weight of liability j in time t  jttw  is 
given by: 
 
)( jtjtjjjt rbrbswtw                                                                                            (6) 
 
where 0jb  is the responsiveness of the time-varying weight to the interest rate 
spread of liability j; the interest rate spread of liability j is defined as the difference 
between the market interest rate of liability j in period t  jtr  and the corresponding 
benchmark interest rate  jtrb . Note that the interest rate spread can be either positive 
or negative. For instance, in many EMU countries the spread between the deposit 
interest rates and the EONIA interest rate was negative before the crisis but has 
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become positive after it, as a result of the increasing uncertainty regarding the security 
of deposit money in the EU banking sector.
4
 
 
The parameter jb  is estimated along the same lines with the parameter ia . We define 
a period minimum value: 
 
  eswtw jj min                                                                                                       (7) 
 
where e is a positive number that is subtracted from the static weight when the 
dynamic weight takes its minimum value. It holds that: 
 
   jjjjj rbrbswtw  maxmin                                                                              (8) 
 
Combining expressions (7) and (8), yields: 
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The ratio that is based on time-varying balance sheet weights is called Dynamic Net 
Stable Funding Ratio (DNSFR) and is defined as follows: 
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Table 2 reports the interest rates that have been used for each balance sheet item in the 
construction of the above ratio. At this point a clarification is in order. The spread 
between these interest rates and the baseline interest rate should be viewed as a very 
crude approximation of the time-varying assets’ liquidity and liabilities’ stability. This 
spread can be significantly affected by other factors, such as the institutional 
structures in each country and the financing practices of banks. Moreover, the actual 
financial risk is also reflected on various macroeconomic factors, such as the 
                                                 
4
 See e.g. ECB (2012b). 
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unemployment rate of banks’ borrowers, the growth rate of the economy, the 
developments in the housing market etc. However, the advantage of the use of interest 
rates is that they are available for each balance sheet category and can be easily 
employed to provide an overall picture of the time-varying liquidity of banks, which 
is the purpose of our analysis. A more detailed and integrated analysis of bank 
liquidity can well be the subject of future extension of the present approach.    
 
Table 2: Interest rates used to calculate the balance sheet weighting in DNSFR 
Liability Interest rate
Capital and reserves -
Deposits with agreed maturity greater than 1 year Interest rate on deposits with agreed maturity greater than 1 year 
(to non-financial corporations and households)
Debt securities issued for longer than 1 year -
Deposits with agreed maturity up to 1 year Interest rate on deposits with agreed maturity up to 1 year (to non-
financial corporations and households)
Deposits redeemable at notice Interest rate on deposits redeemable at notice (to households)
Repurchase agreements Interest rate on repurchase agreements (to non-financial 
corporations and households)
Overnight deposits Interest rate on overnight deposits (to non-financial corporations 
and households)
Deposits of monetary financial institutions Euribor 3 months rate
Deposits of the central government -
External liabilities Interest rate on deposits with agreed maturity up to 1 year (to non-
financial corporations and households)
All other liabilities -
Asset Interest rate
- -
Loans to monetary financial institutions Euribor 3 months rate
Long-term interest rate for convergence purposes, debt security 
issued (10 years) for domestic securities 
Euro area 10-year government benchmark bond yield for other than 
domestic securities 
Lending for house purchase Interest rate for house purchases (to households)
Loans to non-financial corporations Interest rate on non-financial corporations
Loans to households excluding  lending for house 
purchase
Interest on consumer credit and other loans (to households)
External assets Interest on consumer credit and other loans (to households)
All other assets -
Available amount of Stable Funding (ASF )
Required amount of Stable Funding (RSF )
Holdings of securities other than shares issued by 
general government in the euro area
Notes:  
1/ Households include also non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH). 
2/ Interest rates on loans and deposits are either annualised agreed rates (AAR) or narrowly defined 
effective rates (NDER) (see ECB, 2003 for definitions). These interest rates refer to new business 
indicators. 
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2.2 Application to EMU-12 countries 
 
In our estimation, aggregated data from the ECB database over the period 2003:01 to 
2012:07 have been utilised. The analysis refers to the EMU-12 countries (Belgium, 
Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, Finland, the Netherlands, 
Austria and Luxemburg) for which data are available for a sufficiently long period of 
time.
5
 In the case of government securities on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets, 
we have opted for making a distinction according to the nationality of their issuer: the 
credit and market risk of these securities is significantly affected by the fiscal position 
of the country that issues them. For this purpose, the Bruegel database on sovereign 
bond holding has been employed. This database provides data on the amount of each 
country’s government securities held by the domestic banking sector, allowing us to 
estimate securities’ “home bias”. Although these data do not allow us to fully consider 
the impact of government securities’ nationality on the liquidity position of banks, the 
consideration of the “home bias” permits us to capture, at least partially, some 
important aspects of this impact.  
 
Figure 1 displays the evolution of NSFR and DNSFR over the period under 
examination. The vertical dotted line marks the time point in which the collapse of the 
Lehman Brothers occurred (2008:08). We observe the following: First, in almost all 
countries DNSFR was higher than NSFR before the collapse of the Lehman Brothers 
and lower thereafter.
6
 This suggests that the liquidity ratio adopted by Basel III 
potentially underestimates the liquidity position of banks before the crisis and 
overestimates it in the after-crisis period. Second, in 7 out of 12 countries (Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Austria and Luxembourg) the evolution of liquidity 
over the last decade seems to be quite different according to the ratio utilised. In 
particular, while NSFR suggests that the bank liquidity in these countries has either 
remained approximately the same or even improved after the collapse of the Lehman 
Brothers, DNSFR shows a substantial deterioration in liquidity.  
                                                 
5
 The exact data sources of our analysis are reported in Appendix B. 
6
 There are only some exceptions in the case of Germany, Ireland, Austria and Luxemburg for which in 
some time periods before the crisis the DNSFR was lower than the NSFR.  
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Figure 1: Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) and Dynamic Stable Funding Ratio (DNSFR) in percentage points, EMU-12 countries, 2003:01 to 2012:07 
a) Belgium 
 
b) Germany 
 
c) Ireland 
 
d) Greece 
 
 14 
(continued from the previous page) 
e) Spain 
 
f) France 
 
 
 
g) Italy 
 
h) Portugal 
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(continued from the previous page) 
i) Finland 
 
j) Netherlands 
 
k) Austria 
 
l) Luxembourg 
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The difference between the two indices in the aftermath of the crisis has basically to 
do with the developments in the government bond market as well as in the deposit 
market. The crisis has substantially modified the liquidity of bonds that have been 
issued by countries with fiscal problems. Hence, banks that hold government bonds of 
these countries have seen a deterioration in their liquidity position. Due to the “home 
bias” in the holding of government bonds, this implies that the banking sector in 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain has most greatly been affected by the distress in 
the bond market. Furthermore, the crisis has influenced the behaviour of depositors 
especially in economies in which a banking crisis coexists with a severe fiscal crisis 
and a generalised uncertainty regarding the macroeconomic prospects. In these 
economies the interest rate on deposits has increased, reflecting the decline in the 
stability of deposit liabilities. Again, the countries that have been more importantly 
been affected by this development are Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. This 
explains why the highest divergence between the dynamic and the static ratio is 
reported for the banking sector of these countries.  
 
On the basis of the above estimates, it can be overall argued that the NSFR does not 
successfully gauge the decline in the liquidity of banks that seems to have occurred in 
various EMU countries as a result of the recent financial distress. By assigning static 
weighs in banks’ balance sheet items, this ratio ignores the changing nature of 
liquidity, which is particularly important in periods of financial distress. On the 
contrary, the dynamic liquidity ratio suggested in this paper reflects the effects of 
financial distress on the liquidity of assets and the stability of liabilities, depicting 
more accurately the fragility of banks over periods of high volatility and uncertainty, 
as the current one.   
 
3. The link between bank liquidity and macroeconomic fragility in the EMU: An 
econometric analysis 
 
In Basel III, the imposed minimum liquidity requirements are invariant to 
macroeconomic conditions. For example, the minimum NSFR is equal to 100% 
irrespective of the degree of financial fragility in the macroeconomy (see BCBS 
2010a). However, from a macroprudential point of view the bank liquidity should, 
arguably, increase when the macro system seems to be more prone to financial 
 17 
instability. The rational is twofold. First, excessive financial expansion is commonly 
one of the underlying reasons behind the build-up of financial fragility structures. A 
rise in bank liquidity (which, practically, implies lower debt expansion for both 
financial and non-financial corporations) can slow down the financial instability 
tendencies of the macro system. Second, a more liquid financial system can more 
successfully absorb the shocks that stem from the real economy. For instance, a better 
liquidity position allows banks to more successfully face the problems arising from an 
unexpected rise in the loan default rate of households and firms.    
 
In this section we explore whether the banking sector in EMU countries increases its 
liquidity when the macro system becomes more fragile. Failure to find a positive link 
between bank liquidity and macro fragility implies that banks do not self-impose 
macro fragility-liquidity requirements. This would suggest the need for the regulatory 
agents in the EMU to impose such requirements in order to decrease the system-wide 
risk.  
 
In our empirical investigation bank liquidity is captured both by the static and the 
dynamic liquidity ratio developed in the previous section. Following Tymoigne 
(2011), the macroeconomic fragility is viewed “as the propensity of financial 
problems to generate financial instability”. In this paper, the macroeconomic fragility 
is proxied by the credit-to-GDP ratio. Although this measure cannot provide a detailed 
view of the macroeconomic fragility (see Tymoigne, 2011 for sector-specific indices), 
it can be used to give an overall picture of some financial instability tendencies. 
Empirical evidence has shown that the credit-to-GDP ratio can quite successfully 
signal periods of financial distress (see Drehmann et al., 2010). An additional 
advantage is that it is available for most of the countries under investigation.
7
     
 
3.1 Econometric methodology 
 
The econometric exploration of the link between bank liquidity and macro fragility is 
conducted by utilising time-series techniques and making the analysis distinctively for 
                                                 
7
 Note also that credit-to-GDP ratio has been used by Basel III as the main guide for determining the 
appropriate amount of countercyclical capital buffer (see BCBS, 2010b).   
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each country with the use of aggregated data for the banking sector.
8
 Time-series 
techniques have been chosen instead of panel data ones for two reasons. First, we 
wish to avoid the heterogeneity bias which basically stems from the diversification of 
macroeconomic fragility within the EMU. Second, the purpose of the econometric 
investigation is to examine how each national banking sector responds to the 
macroeconomic fragility of its country. Thus, a panel investigation of this issue would 
not be illuminating for our purposes. 
 
The econometric analysis is conducted by utilising the ARDL-bounds testing 
procedure, developed by Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran et al. (2001). The main 
advantage of this approach, relative to the more traditional Johansen (1988) maximum 
likelihood method, is twofold. First, it allows us to check for cointegration when the 
variables of the econometric analysis are either I(0) or I(1). On the contrary, 
Johansen’s cointegration technique prerequisites the existence of only I(1) series. As 
will be shown below, in our sample the possibility of I(0) series cannot be excluded, 
implying that the ARDL-bounds testing approach is more appropriate. Second, the 
ARDL-bounds testing procedure is more suitable for small sample data sizes, as our 
own one. The Johansen method relies on a VAR system of equations and, thus, the 
degrees of freedom may decline significantly when the size of the sample is small. 
 
The following econometric specification is used: 
 
ttt uCREDITLIQ  10                                                                                   (11) 
 
where LIQ is the liquidity ratio (either the NSFR or the DNSFR, see section 2) and 
CREDIT is the credit-to-GDP ratio obtained from the ECB database. The credit-to-
GDP ratio is available on a quarterly basis. For the purposes of our analysis the 
quarterly data have been transformed to monthly ones, using the cubic-spline 
function. All variables in the econometric analysis are expressed in percentage points. 
The analysis refers to the period 2003:01 to 2012:07.
 9
  
                                                 
8
 Recent empirical literature has investigated the relationship between banks’ liquidity and micro 
characteristics using micro panel datasets (see e.g. Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Fungacova et al., 
2010; Distinguin et al., 2012; Horvath et al., 2012). 
9
 For the Netherlands and Luxemburg the data start from 2005:01 while for Austria they start from 
2006:01. 
 19 
 
Following Pesaran et al. (2001), the econometric analysis is conducted in three steps. 
First, we conduct unit root tests. At this stage it is important to rule out the possibility 
of I(2) series. We initially apply the Phillips-Perron unit root test. However, the 
existence of a structural break in our series could reduce the ability of this test to 
properly identify the order of integration. The financial crisis has potentially caused 
such a structural break in our series. To examine whether a break could change the 
order of integration in our series we use the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test with one 
structural break. This break point is endogenously determined by the data using as a 
criterion the minimisation of the ADF t-test statistic. We estimate two models of the 
Zivot and Andrews (1992) test: model A with a change in intercept and model C with 
a change in both intercept and slope. The null hypothesis is that the time series has a 
unit root without a structural break; the alternative hypothesis suggests that there is a 
trend stationary series with a structural break.  
 
Second, we estimate an error correction form of function (11) using the OLS 
estimation technique: 
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         (12) 
 
The ARDL-bounds testing procedure requires the estimation of the F-test statistic that 
tests the null hypothesis that 0ˆˆ 21  cc , as well as of the t-test statistic that checks the 
null hypothesis that 0ˆ1 c . These statistics are then compared with the critical values 
provided by Pesaran et al. (2001). The existence of a long-run relationship between 
LIQ and CREDIT requires that the null hypothesis is rejected. If the t-test and F-test 
statistics are higher than the upper bound of the respective critical values then the null 
hypothesis is rejected. If the t-test and F-test statistics are below the lower bound of 
the respective critical values then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and no long-
run relationship exists. When the computed t-test and F-test statistics falls within the 
bounds of the critical values, it is not possible to arrive at a conclusive decision. 
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Before estimating equation (12) we need to control for the existence of a possible 
structural breakpoint. In particular, we test whether such a break exists in September 
2008, when Lehman Brothers collapsed.
10
 To this end, the Chow test is conducted in 
which the null hypothesis suggests that no break exists. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis implies that a dummy variable must be included in equation (12). 
Additionally, it is essential to choose the optimal lag structure of equation (12). In this 
procedure, our criterion is the minimisation of the Akaike (AIC) and Schwartz (SBC) 
Bayesian Information Criteria as well as the existence of no autocorrelation. 
 
Third, if cointegration has been found, we proceed to estimate the optimal ARDL 
specification which is specified using the AIC. Note, though, that in our analysis we 
have chosen the ARDL models to be estimated even if no cointegration is found. This 
allows us to further check that the result of the cointegration analysis is correct. From 
the estimation of the optimal ARDL we obtain the long-run coefficient for CREDIT 
and the error correction term. Moreover, the estimations are also conducted for the 
sub-periods 2003:01 to 2008:08 and 2008:09 to 2012:07 to further examine whether 
the crisis has prompted a change in the relationship between CREDIT and LIQ. 
 
Overall, the existence of a positive long-run relationship between the liquidity ratios 
and the credit-to-GDP requires that: (i) the F and t statistics indicate cointegration; (ii) 
there is a statistically significant long-run coefficient for CREDIT and (iii) the 
(lagged) equilibrium correction term is negative and statistically significant. If any of 
these conditions is not satisfied for a specific country, then it can be argued that the 
liquidity of this country’s banking sector does not react positively to a rise in the 
credit-to-GDP ratio, supporting the view for the imposition of macro fragility-related 
liquidity requirements.  
 
3.2 Results 
 
In Appendix C the results from the Phillips-Perron unit root test are reported. It turns 
out that the variables are a mixture of I(0) and I(1). When the Zivot and Andrews is 
used to control for the existence of a structural break (see Appendix D), some of the 
                                                 
10
 ECB (2012b) has reported a break in bank financing patterns in the third quarter of 2008.  
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I(1) series according to the Phillips-Perron test appear to be I(0) with one structural 
break. The existence of stationary series in our sample indicates the need for the use 
of the ARDL-bounds testing approach to cointegration, which is valid for both I(0) 
and I(1) variables.  
 
Table 3 and Table 4 display the various F and t statistics for NSFR and DNSFR 
respectively, over the whole period of the analysis. The Chow test, presented in 
Appendix E, indicates the existence of a structural break in most EMU countries. AIC 
and SBC criteria have been used to determine the appropriate lag order p for each 
country with or without deterministic trend (see Appendix F). In Table 5 and Table 6 
the estimation results for the optimal ARDL specification over the whole period and 
the two sub-periods are presented (both for NSFR and DNSFR).  
 
Table 3: F and t statistics for testing the existence of long-run relationship of equation (11) for the 
dependent variable NSFR, EMU-12 countries, 2003:01 to 2012:07 
p tIII FII FIII tv FIV FV
BE 3 -3.94
c 5.20c 7.79c -3.20a 5.75c 7.63c
GE 1 -1.14
a 1.44a 1.39a -0.42a  1.39a 1.98a
IR 3 - 2.61
a 10.33c 14.44c -2.22a 9.65c 6.62b
GR 3 -1.71
a 1.53a 1.55a -1.58a 7.73c 10.35c
SP 3 -1.88
a 2.64a 2.26a -2.22a 2.50a 3.73a
FR 2  -2.06
a  2.19a  2.53a -1.98a 1.69a 2.30a
IT 3 -3.00
b  3.36a  5.02b -3.42b 4.32a 5.86a
PT 3 -3.53
c 12.29c 6.23c -3.64b 4.41a 6.62b
FI 1 -3.8
c 5.94c 8.58c -3.76c 5.66c 7.12c
NL 3 -6.04
c 14.71c 21.8c -6.09c 14.73c 20.85c
AT 2 -4.22
c 6.95c 9.39c -4.01c 6.67c 8.24c
LU 3 -0.97
a 4.29c 1.17a -0.82a 0.87a 0.75a
Without trends With trends
 
Note: 
a
 indicates that the statistic lies below the 0.05 lower bound, 
b
 that it falls within the 0.05 bounds 
and 
c 
 that the statistic lies above the 0.05 upper value; tIII and tV are the t-test statistics for the t-tests of 
Pesaran et al. (2001) for cases III and V respectively; FII, FIII, FIV and FV are the F-test statistics for the 
F-tests of Pesaran et al. (2001) for the cases II, III, IV and V respectively (see Pesaran et al., 2001 for 
the critical values of the t-tests and F-tests); p is the selected lag order for equation (12). 
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The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 show that when NSFR is used as a dependent 
variable there is evidence in favour of a long-run relationship for Belgium, Portugal, 
Finland, the Netherlands and Austria. When DNSFR is used as a liquidity ratio, 
cointegration also exists for Spain, France and Italy.  
 
In the case of Belgium and Portugal, the estimation results for the ARDL model 
illustrate that there is an inverse statistically significant relationship between NSFR 
and the credit-to-GDP ratio. This relationship is not, though, robust for the two sub-
periods. For instance, in Belgium the statistical significant coefficient of CREDIT is 
negative for the period 2003:01 to 2008:08, but it turns positive for the period 2008:09 
to 2012:07. In France there is also a negative relationship between credit-to-GDP and 
DNSFR, but this is insignificant for the subperiods. For Finland, the Netherlands and 
Spain no statistically significant effect of CREDIT on the liquidity ratios is reported. 
In the case of Austria a statistically important positive effect of CREDIT on NSFR 
turns out to exist for the whole period. The same holds for Italy when DNSFR is used 
as a liquidity ratio, although in the subperiods this effect ceases to exist. Overall, these 
results show very little evidence of a long-run positive relationship between bank 
liquidity and macroeconomic fragility in the EMU.   
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Table 4: F and t statistics for testing the existence of long-run relationship of equation (11) for the 
dependent variable DNSFR, EMU-12 countries, 2003:01 to 2012:07 
p tIII FII FIII tv FIV FV
BE 2 -4.33
c  6.47c  9.61c -4.16c  6.46c  9.67c
GE 1 -2.14
a  2.16a  2.97a -0.15a  3.93a 5.88a
IR 3 -0.59
a 5.26c 7.61c -0.65a 5.06b 0.77a
GR 3 -2.12
a 1.86a   2.70a -3.38a  4.61a  6.75c
SP 2 -4.57
c  7.39c 10.56c -4.31c  7.09c  9.89c
FR 3 -4.04
c   6.53c 9.66c -3.94c 6.44c 8.65c
IT 3 - 3.87
c 5.05c 7.51c -3.93c 5.31c 7.94c
PT 3 - 5.37
c  10.76c 15.48c -5.55c 10.96c 15.69c
FI 1 -4.33
c 8.12c 11.87c -4.31c 7.85c 9.7c
NL 3 -3.71
c 10.12c  15.17c -3.65b 10.09c 13.15c
AT 3 -3.54
c 4.43c  6.29c -3.50b  4.21a 6.27c
LU 1 -0.76
a 2.66a  1.20a -0.74a 0.90a 0.82a
Without trends With trends
 
Note: 
a
 indicates that the statistic lies below the 0.05 lower bound, 
b
 that it falls within the 0.05 bounds 
and 
c 
 that the statistic lies above the 0.05 upper value; tIII and tV are the t-test statistics for the t-tests of 
Pesaran et al. (2001) for cases III and V respectively; FII, FIII, FIV and FV are the F-test statistics for the 
F-tests of Pesaran et al. (2001) for the cases II, III, IV and V respectively (see Pesaran et al., 2001 for 
the critical values of the t-tests and F-tests); p is the selected lag order for equation (12). 
 
In the countries in which no cointegration is found, the results from the estimation of 
the ARDL models (see Tables 5 and 6) show that only in two of them (Germany and 
Greece) there may be a possibility for a positive relationship between CREDIT and 
the liquidity ratios. For the other countries the coefficient of CREDIT is either 
insignificant or negative. Therefore, even if someone doubts the inference of the 
Pesaran et al. (2001) test, the overall conclusion for little evidence of a positive link 
between macroeconomic fragility and bank liquidity in the EMU does not alter.  
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Table 5: Estimation results for the ARDL model, dependent variable: NSFR, EMU-12 countries 
(a) Period: 2003:01 to 2012:07 
CREDIT EC-1 R2 -Adjusted X2SC(12) X
2
FF X
2
H
Trend Dummy ARDL
BE  -0.37** -0.19*** 0.95  15.21 [0.23] 0.001 [0.97] 4.41 [0.03] No Yes ARDL(1,0)
GE 1.44 -0.02 0.93 28.14 [0.005] 1.69 [0.19] 2.62 [0.10] No Yes ARDL(3,4)
IR -0.32** -0.09** 0.86 7.97 [0.78] 0.40 [0.84] 17.23 [0.00] No Yes ARDL(3,3)
GR 2.23 -0.08* 0.90 30.43 [0.002] 0.001 [0.97] 0.84 [0.35] Yes Yes ARDL(2,1)
SP  -0.06*  -0.17*** 0.95 9.66 [0.64] 0.18 [0.67] 0.03 [0.84] Yes Yes ARDL(1,0)
FR -0.51*** -0.14*** 0.93 16.50 [0.16]  9.65 [0.002] 2.61 [0.10] No Yes ARDL(1,0)
IT  0.14**  -0.41*** 0.39  13.23 [0.35]  2.88 [0.08]  1.80 [0.17] Yes No   ARDL(2,0)
PT -4.91*** -0.32*** 0.73 5.85 [0.92] 0.80 [0.36]  7.61 [0.006] No No   ARDL(1,0) 
FI -0.11 -0.24*** 0.85 8.10 [0.77] 6.73 [0.009] 9.14 [0.002] No Yes  ARDL(3,0)
NL 0.008 -0.48*** 0.80 9.05 [0.69] 3.02 [0.08] 10.12 [0.001] No Yes ARDL(1,0)
AT  0.16***  -0.73*** 0.88 16.38 [0.17]  8.96 [0.003] 0.95 [0.32] No Yes  ARDL(1,2)
LU 0.27 -0.02 0.93 13.73 [0.31] 0.03 [0.84] 0.75 [0.38] No Yes ARDL(3,0)
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(continued from the previous page) 
(b) Period: 2003:01 to 2008:08 
CREDIT EC-1 R2 -Adjusted X2SC(12) X
2
FF X
2
H
Trend ARDL
BE  -0.56*** -0.26*** 0.85 7.64 [0.81] 0.55 [0.45] 0.32 [0.56] No  ARDL(1,4)
GE 0.26*** -0.13** 0.90 14.68 [0.25] 0.004 [0.94] 0.23 [0.62] No ARDL(1,0)
IR  -0.24 -0.07* 0.87 13.94 [0.30]  3.67 [0.05] 11.87 [0.001] No  ARDL(2,0)
GR 1.42***  -0.51*** 0.92 7.93 [0.79] 0.12 [0.72] 0.42 [0.51] Yes ARDL(2,2)
SP 0.08 -0.40*** 0.96  9.42 [0.66] 3.80 [0.05] 0.05 [0.82] Yes  ARDL(1,1)
FR 0.68 -0.16** 0.96 9.59 [0.65] 0.07 [0.77] 0.04 [0.83] Yes ARDL(1,0) 
IT -0.62** -0.40*** 0.58  14.96 [0.24]  2.01 [0.15] 0.01 [0.89] Yes ARDL(2,0)
PT 0.24*** -0.56*** 0.57 4.96 [0.95] 0.19 [0.66] 3.90 [0.04] Yes ARDL(1,0) 
FI -0.15 -0.15*** 0.88 9.68 [0.64] 1.05 [0.30] 0.02 [0.87] No ARDL(1,0)
NL 0.25 -0.55*** 0.27 14.09 [0.29] 0.04 [0.83]  24.55 [0.00] No  ARDL(1,0)
AT - - - - - - - -
LU 0.09***  -0.74*** 0.97 17.23 [0.14] 0.02 [0.86]  0.55 [0.45] Yes ARDL(1,0) 
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(c) Period: 2008:09 to 2012:07 
CREDIT EC-1 R2 -Adjusted X2SC(12) X
2
FF X
2
H
Trend ARDL
BE 1.81* -0.21** 0.73  9.15 [0.68] -0.04 [0.94] 0.007 [0.93] Yes ARDL(1,0)
GE  1.60**  -0.36*** 0.92 20.92 [0.05] 10.86 [0.001] 0.57 [0.44] Yes ARDL(1,4)
IR -0.05  -0.35*** 0.83 16.21 [0.18] 0.001 [0.97] 3.93 [0.04] Yes  ARDL(3,0)
GR -5.45 -0.03 0.77 10.42 [0.57] 0.56 [0.45] 0.01 [0.90] No  ARDL(2,0)
SP 0.31*** -0.39*** 0.67 13.42 [0.33] 0.02 [0.86]  0.29 [0.58] No  ARDL(1,4)
FR 0.02 -0.44*** 0.27  8.27 [0.76]  1.90 [0.16] 0.30 [0.57] No ARDL(1,0)
IT 0.05 -1 0.35 11.11 [0.51] 0.17 [0.67] 0.43 [0.50] Yes  ARDL(0,1)
PT 0.07 -0.33*** 0.44 13.90 [0.30] 0.47 [0.48] 3.86 [0.04] No ARDL(1,0) 
FI 0.009 -0.63*** 0.09 15.90 [0.19] 0.54 [0.46]  2.11 [0.14] No  ARDL(1,0)
NL  -0.23** -0.55*** 0.53 6.43 [0.89] 0.05 [0.82] 0.10 [0.74] Yes ARDL(4,0)
AT - - - - - - - -
LU  -0.0006  -0.52*** 0.81  19.26 [0.08] 0.37 [0.54] 0.64 [0.42] Yes ARDL(4,0)
 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 2R - Adjusted is the adjusted squared multiple correlation 
coefficient. )12(2SCx , 
2
FFx  and 
2
Hx  are maximum-likelihood test statistics for the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, for no functional form mis-specification and of no 
heteroskedasticity, respectively; p-values are reported in brackets. 
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Table 6: Estimation results for the ARDL model, dependent variable: DNSFR, EMU-12 countries 
(a) Period: 2003:01 to 2012:07 
CREDIT EC-1 R2 -Adjusted X2SC(12) X
2
FF X
2
H
Trend Dummy ARDL
BE  -0.20  -0.22*** 0.97 25.27 [0.01] 0.17 [0.67] 6.94 [0.008] No Yes  ARDL(3,4)
GE  0.49  -0.07** 0.95 14.84 [0.25]  1.78 [0.18] 4.16 [0.04] No Yes ARDL(4,4)
IR -0.66 -0.03 0.91  4.81 [0.96] 3.11 [0.07]  3.91 [0.04] No Yes ARDL(3,0)
GR 0.90**  -0.17*** 0.89 17.99 [0.11] 1.11 [0.29]  8.17 [0.004] Yes Yes ARDL(2,1)
SP  -0.03 -0.21*** 0.98 20.90 [0.05]  1.06 [0.30] 0.65 [0.418] No Yes  ARDL(4,1)
FR  -0.32*** -0.25*** 0.95 12.72 [0.38] 6.74 [0.009] 2.34 [0.12] No Yes  ARDL(1,0)
IT 0.17* -0.24*** 0.89  14.91 [0.24] 0.35 [0.55] 0.005 [0.94] No Yes ARDL(1,0)
PT 0.05 -0.28*** 0.96  9.26 [0.68] 1.31 [0.25] 2.84 [0.09] No Yes ARDL(1,0)
FI -0.06  -0.26*** 0.93 16.41 [0.17] 9.17 [0.002] 7.68 [0.006] No Yes ARDL(3,0)
NL  0.5 -0.21*** 0.95  5.78 [0.92]  1.55 [0.21] 2.46 [0.11] No Yes ARDL(1,0)
AT 0.28 -0.41*** 0.57 8.80 [0.72] 2.00 [0.15] 0.04 [0.83] No Yes ARDL(1,3)
LU 0.45   -0.03 0.95 18.59 [0.09] 0.001 [0.97] 0.90 [0.34] No Yes  ARDL(4,4)
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(b) Period: 2003:01 to 2008:08 
CREDIT EC-1 R2 -Adjusted X2SC(12) X
2
FF X
2
H
Trend ARDL
BE  -0.55**  -0.19*** 0.82 13.98 [0.30]  1.63 [0.20] 0.003 [0.95] No ARDL(1,4) 
GE -0.23*** -0.26*** 0.77 13.38 [0.34]  1.20 [0.27] 7.12 [0.008] No  ARDL(1,0)
IR -1.41* 0.07 0.90 19.05 [0.08] 2.29 [0.12]  7.84 [0.005] Yes ARDL(4,0)
GR 0.11 -0.16** 0.74 12.19 [0.43] 0.92 [0.37] 0.50 [0.47] No  ARDL(2,1)
SP 0.48*** -0.48*** 0.88 14.40 [0.27] 3.56 [0.05] 0.34 [0.55] Yes  ARDL(1,3)
FR 0.44 -0.36*** 0.91 11.67 [0.47]  0.27 [0.60]  0.06 [0.79] Yes  ARDL(1,0)
IT  -1.38*  -0.20* 0.80  14.10 [0.29]  3.31 [0.06] 1.61 [0.20] Yes ARDL(2,0)
PT 0.05  -0.26** 0.48 9.45 [0.66] 0.15 [0.69]  2.81 [0.09] No  ARDL(3,0)
FI  -0.05 -0.14*** 0.86 7.30 [0.83] 0.05 [0.81] 0.13 [0.71] No ARDL(1,0)
NL  1.29*** -0.45*** 0.66 10.10 [0.60]  2.27 [0.13] 0.14 [0.70] No ARDL(1,0)
AT - - - - - - - -
LU 0.01 -0.54*** 0.96 9.12 [0.69] 0.39 [0.53] 0.01 [0.91] Yes ARDL(1,0)
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(c) Period: 2008:09 to 2012:07 
CREDIT EC-1 R2 -Adjusted X2SC(12) X
2
FF X
2
H
Trend ARDL
BE 0.24 -0.17** 0.75 11.58 [0.48] 0.84 [0.35]  3.71 [0.05] No ARDL(1,0)
GE 4.04*** -0.19*** 0.91 17.92 [0.11] 2.65 [0.10] 0.05 [0.81] No ARDL(3,3)
IR -0.004 -0.28 0.71 19.82 [0.07] 0.02 [0.87] 0.66 [0.41] Yes  ARDL(3,0)
GR 3.20***  -0.32*** 0.77  11.12 [0.51] 0.02 [0.86] 0.54 [0.45] Yes ARDL(1,2)
SP 0.53** -0.26*** 0.82  24.45 [0.01]  12.27 [0.00]   2.65 [0.10] No ARDL(2,4) 
FR 0.09 -0.34*** 0.50 8.30 [0.76] 1.40 [0.23] 11.17 [0.001] No  ARDL(1,0)
IT 0.51 -0.37*** 0.60 13.05 [0.36] 0.05 [0.80] 10.24 [0.001] Yes ARDL(1,1) 
PT 0.16  -0.22***  0.83 20.40 [0.06] 0.71 [0.39] 14.64 [0.00] No ARDL(2,0)
FI   -0.16 -0.59*** 0.25 22.38 [0.03]  3.29 [0.06] 0.32 [0.56] No ARDL(1,0)
NL 0.27 -0.19*** 0.83  4.58 [0.97] 3.42 [0.06] 12.01 [0.001] No  ARDL(1,0)
AT - - - - - - - -
LU -0.0007  -0.34** 0.80 22.28 [0.03] 0.92 [0.33] 0.001 [0.98] Yes ARDL(4,4)
 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 2R - Adjusted is the adjusted squared multiple correlation 
coefficient. )12(2SCx , 
2
FFx  and 
2
Hx  are maximum-likelihood test statistics for the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, for no functional form mis-specification and of no 
heteroskedasticity, respectively; p-values are reported in brackets. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
This paper has centered on the issue of liquidity regulation. This issue has been at the 
core of the innovations of Basel III. The paper has put forward a dynamic liquidity 
ratio that, contrary to the ratios used in Basel III, allows for a time-varying definition 
of bank balance sheet items’ liquidity and stability. The implementation of this ratio 
in the EMU-12 countries has shown that it can more successfully portray the actual 
liquidity problems of banks, especially in the aftermath of the crisis. This implies that 
a more dynamic view of liquidity needs to be adopted in the current regulatory 
framework. 
 
Using the ARDL bounds-testing approach, the paper has also indicated that in most 
EMU countries bank liquidity is not positively related with macroeconomic fragility. 
Based on this evidence, it has been argued that bank liquidity requirements should 
increase when the macroeconomic risk becomes higher. This will allow liquidity 
regulation to play a more substantial role in preventing the financial instability in the 
macroeconomy.   
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Appendix A: Aggregated balance sheet of euro area monetary financial institutions (MFIs) excluding European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB) 
1.1. Loans to euro area residents 2.1. Currency in circulation (Not available)
1.1.1. Monetary financial institutions 2.2. Deposits of euro area residents
1.1.2. General government 2.2.1. Monetary financial institutions
1.1.3. Other euro area residents 2.2.2. Central government
1.1.3.1. Non-financial corporations 2.2.3. Other general government/other euro area residents
1.1.3.2. Households 2.2.3.1. Overnight
1.1.3.2.1. Consumer credit 2.2.3.2. With agreed maturity
1.1.3.2.2. Lending for house purchase 2.2.3.2.1. Up to 1 year
1.1.3.2.3. Other lending 2.2.3.2.2. Over 1 year and up to 2 years
1.1.3.3. Non-monetary financial intermediaries 
other than insurance corporations and pension 
funds
2.2.3.2.3. Over 2 years
1.1.3.4. Insurance corporations and pension 
funds
2.2.3.3. Redeemable at notice
1.2. Holdings of securities other than shares issued by euro area residents 2.2.3.3.1. Up to 3 months
1.2.1. Monetary financial institutions 2.2.3.3.2. Over 3 months
1.2.1.1. Up to 1 year 2.2.3.4. Repurchase agreements
1.2.1.2. Over 1 year and up to 2 years 2.3. Money market fund shares/units
1.2.1.3. Over 2 years 2.4. Debt securities issued
1.2.2. General government 2.4.1. Up to 1 year
1.2.3. Other euro area residents 2.4.2. Over 1 year and up to 2 years
1.3. Money market fund shares/units 2.4.3. Over 2 years
1.4. Holdings of shares/other equity issued by euro area residents 2.5. Capital and reserves
1.4.1. Monetary financial institutions 2.6. External liabilities
1.4.2. Other euro area residents 2.7. Remaining liabilities
1.5. External assets
1.6. Fixed assets
1.7. Remaining assets
1. Assets 2. Liabilities
 
Note: See Colangelo and Lenza (2012) and ECB (2012a) for the definitions of the data. 
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Αppendix B: Description of the data sources 
Variable name Data sources
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR ) ECB, monetary statistics, MFI balance sheets
Credit-to-GDP ratio (CREDIT ) ECB,  Euro area accounts, main indicators
Sovereign bond holding by resident banks Bruegel (see Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012) 
Long-term interest rate for convergence 
purposes, debt security issued (10 years)
ECB, monetary statistics, long term interest rates
Euro area 10-year government benchmark 
bond yield for other than domestic securities 
ECB, monetary statistics, market indices
EONIA interest rate (rb ) ECB, money banking and financial markets, market 
indices
Euribor 3 months rate European Bank Federation
Interest rate on deposits ECB, money banking and financial markets, market 
interest rates, deposits
Interest rate on loans ECB, money banking and financial markets, market 
interest rates, loans
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Appendix C: Philips-Perron unit root tests 
Without trends With trends Without trends With trends
BE NSFR -0.247 -2.571  -11.031*** -11.180***
DNSFR -0.203 -2.035 -10.042*** -10.136***
CREDIT  0.066 -1.433 -4.627*** -4.701***
GE NSFR -0.422 -1.845 -10.909***  -11.002***
DNSFR -0.111 -1.744 -10.636*** -10.721***
CREDIT -1.701 -1.390 -3.117** -3.211*
IR NSFR -2.476 -2.243 -12.954*** -13.095***
DNSFR -0.842 -2.159  -15.310*** -15.886***
CREDIT -1.029 -0.820 -3.399**  -3.470**
GR NSFR -2.015 -2.138 -15.102*** -15.033***
DNSFR -1.764  -3.186* -13.840*** -13.788***
CREDIT -1.888 0.918 -3.096** -3.504**
SP NSFR -1.010 -2.202 -11.693*** -11.674***
DNSFR -0.534 -2.036 -9.206 *** -9.167***
CREDIT -3.510***  2.348 -1.270 -2.687
FR NSFR -1.863 -2.251 -12.848*** -12.902***
DNSFR -1.401 -3.317* -11.505***  -11.462***
CREDIT 0.343 -2.261 -3.729*** -3.730**
IT NSFR -5.276***  -5.579*** -18.902*** -18.958***
DNSFR -1.167 -2.215 -12.618*** -12.642***
CREDIT -2.074 0.477 -3.867*** -3.904**
PT NSFR -2.956** -4.725*** -13.907*** -13.837***
DNSFR -0.892 -2.172 -11.408*** -11.368***
CREDIT -0.895 -0.508 -3.319** -3.382*
FI NSFR 2.536  -3.558** -14.746*** -15.132***
DNSFR -1.939  -2.630 -13.339*** -13.501***
CREDIT -0.620 -1.711 -3.972*** -3.953**
NL NSFR -3.530*** -3.981** -10.008*** -10.110***
DNSFR -1.666 -2.157 -8.987*** -8.959***
CREDIT  -1.530 -1.974  -3.840*** -3.804**
AT NSFR -1.800 -2.923 -13.537*** -13.618***
DNSFR -3.574*** -3.692** -9.056*** -9.002***
CREDIT -1.380 -1.120 -3.352**  -3.486**
LU NSFR -2.167 -1.048 -11.342*** -12.538***
DNSFR -1.885 -1.233 -10.603*** -10.975***
CREDIT -1.287 -1.876 -4.303*** -4.324***
Levels First differences
 
Note: The table reports 
tZ  statistics. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Appendix D: Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root tests with one structural break 
t Break point t Break point
BE NSFR -3.303 2008-10 -3.609 2006-09
DNSFR -4.275 2008-10 -4.065 2008-10
CREDIT -5.278** 2008-03 -4.049 2010-12
GE NSFR -15.144*** 2010-12 -14.201*** 2010-12
DNSFR -4.810** 2010-12 -4.320 2010-12
CREDIT -5.335** 2008-07 -6.359*** 2008-07
IR NSFR -3.663 2008-10 -3.907 2008-10
DNSFR -2.966 2007-05 -3.482 2007-01
CREDIT -1.925 2008-01 -2.996 2008-06
GR NSFR -3.691 2008-11 -2.524 2009-01
DNSFR -3.066 2006-07 -3.629 2011-02
CREDIT -0.132 2011-01 -1.802 2010-09
SP NSFR -4.552 2009-05 -4.789 2009-05
DNSFR -4.181 2008-09 -4.388 2008-10
CREDIT -2.432 2010-05 -3.597 2009-01
FR NSFR -3.998 2005-11 -4.826 2005-12
DNSFR -4.443 2010-09 -6.019*** 2008-10
CREDIT -5.188** 2010-09 -5.387** 2009-06
IT NSFR -4.153 2010-11 -4.006 2010-11
DNSFR -4.531 2008-11 -4.699 2008-11
CREDIT -3.216 2010-06 -6.141*** 2008-11
PT NSFR -5.408** 2004-12 -5.817*** 2004-12
DNSFR -7.086*** 2008-10 -7.000*** 2008-10
CREDIT -3.134 2007-04 -3.360 2008-04
FI NSFR -3.368 2010-12 -3.619 2008-10
DNSFR -4.118 2008-10 -4.534 2008-10
CREDIT -4.070 2007-12 -4.695 2009-06
NL NSFR -4.704 2006-10 -4.710 2006-10
DNSFR -5.723*** 2006-10  -5.714*** 2006-10
CREDIT -4.795 2007-01 -4.522 2007-01
AT NSFR -3.590 2005-09 -7.713*** 2005-09
DNSFR -4.913** 2005-10 -5.022 2005-10
CREDIT -2.718 2007-10 -3.629 2007-10
LU NSFR -2.717 2004-06 -3.382 2006-01
DNSFR -3.135 2007-12 -5.921*** 2006-10
CREDIT -6.276*** 2006-09 -7.626*** 2006-09
Model CModel A
 
Note: The table reports the t-test statistics. Critical values for model A (model C) are equal to -5.43 (-
5.57) and -4.80 (-5.08) at 0.01 and 0.05 significant levels, respectively. The symbols *** and ** denote 
statistical significance at 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 37 
Appendix E: Chow tests results for equation (11) 
BE  2.81 (0.065)  25.2 (0.000)
GE  80.5 (0.000) 175.7 (0.000)
IR 6.85 (0.002)  3.21 (0.044)
GR 62.41 (0.000) 16.88 (0.000)
SP 22.72 (0.000)  206.8 (0.000)
FR 69.75 (0.000) 13.84 (0.000)
IT 0.33 (0.714)  97.2 (0.000)
PT  2.02 (0.137)  141.1 (0.000)
FI  3.68 (0.028)  10.56 (0.000)
NL  23.68 (0.000) 100.1 (0.000)
AT 51.16 (0.000)  5.71 (0.005)
LU 21.4 (0.000)  19.2 (0.000)
NSFR  and CREDIT DNSFR  and CREDIT
F F
 
Note: The table shows the F-test statistics; p-values are reported in the parentheses. 
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Appendix F: Statistics for selecting the lag order of equation (12) 
p AIC SBC X
2
SC AIC SBC X
2
SC p AIC SBC X
2
SC AIC SBC X
2
SC
BE 1 -249.7 -259.2 23.7** -250.2 -261 23.1** BE 1 -254.2 -263.7 31.2*** -255.2 -266 31.9
2 -250.7 -262.9 23.8** -251.4 -265 23.1** 2 -254.8 -267 33.3*** -255.6 -269.2 34.7
3 -250 -264.9 18.3 -250.1 -266.3 16.9 3 -254.2 -269.1 27.3*** -255.2 -271.4 27.8***
GE 1 -241.1 -250.6 19.8* -241.4 -252.2 21.2** GE 1 -250.5 -259.9 14.1 -248.5 -259.4 21**
2 -235.9 -248.1 38*** -235.9 -249.5 33.9*** 2 -242.8 -255 22.4* -238 -251.5 15
3 -229.7 -244.6 33.2*** -230.7 -247 33.4*** 3 -239.6 -254.5 14.8 -238.1 -254.4 17.8
IR 1 -181.4 -190.8 10.5 -182.2 -193 10.6 IR 1 -180.9 -190.3 10.4 -181.6 -192.4 10.4
2 -180 -192.2 7.9 -180.8 -194.3 8.1 2 -180.3 -192.5 5.4 -181.2 -194.8 5.6
3 -181.8 -196.7 8.9 -182.7 -198.9 8.9 3 -182.2 -197.1 8.18 -183.1 -199.4 8.2
GR 1 -245.2 -254.7 17.6 -236.6 -247.5 28.8*** GR 1 -247.7 -257.2 19.7* -244.4 -255.2 18
2 -246.3 -258.5 12.1 -237.7 -251.2 27.8*** 2 -248.7 -260.9 16 -245.6 -259.2 21.5**
3 -247.9 -262.8 14.7 -238.9 -255.1 29.3*** 3 -250.7 -265.6 18 -247.3 -263.6 19.7*
SP 1 -138.5 -148 7.8 -138.6 -149.4 8.6 SP 1 -179.7 -189.1 29.4*** -180.5 -191.3 30.5***
2 -140.2 -152.4 9.4 -139.8 -153.3 11.1 2 -181 -193.2 29.4*** -181.9 -195.4 29.8***
3 -141.9 -156.8 16.8 -141.3 -157.6 18.2 3 -179.3 -194.28 -194.24** -180.3 -196.6 25.6**
FR 1 -206.2 -215.7 17.7 -207.2 -199.2 17.7 FR 1 -219.8 -229.2 19.7* -220.8 -231.6 20*
2 -206.9 -219.1 15.5 -207.8 -221.4 15.6 2 -220.8 -233 20.9** -221.8 -235.3 21**
3 -207.8 -222.7 19.0* -208.7 -224.9 19.4* 3 -220.9 -235.8 22.2** -221.8 -238 22.5
IT 1 -185.6 -193.7 11.1 -184.3 -193.8 12.5 IT 1 -223.2 -232.7 14.1 -223.4 -234.3 14.2
2 -186.1 -196.9 12.8 -185.3 -197.5 13 2 -224.5 -236.7 32*** -225.1 -238.6 32***
3 -187.6 -201.2 13 -187.1 -202 15 3 -225.6 -240.5 30.1*** -226.1 -242.4 30.9***
PT 1 -178.2 -186.3 7.4 -178.7 -188.2 7.8 PT 1 -194.2 -203.7 12.7 -194.4 -205.2 14
2 -180 -190.9 9.2 -180.7 -192.9 8.5 2 -196.1 -208.3 14.3 -196.4 -209.9 15.7
3 -181.8 -195.3 9.5 -182.3 -197.2 8.3 3 -196.6 -211.5 13.7 -196.6 -212.9 16.2
FI 1 -270.2 -279.7 17.1 -271.2 -282.1 17 FI 1 -269.3 -278.8 19.3* -270.3 -281.1 19.1*
2 -267.2 -279.4 9.6 -268.2 -281.8 9.8 2 -267.6 -279.8 14.8 -268.6 -282.1 15.2
3 -268.6 -283.5 8.2 -269.5 -285.8 8.7 3 -268.9 -283.8 13 -269.9 -286.1 13.8
NL 1 -166.3 -175 44.6*** -166.8 -176.6 43*** NL 1 -179.7 -188.4 21.3* -180.1 -190 22.1**
2 -166.5 -177.6 44.1*** -167.1 -179.5 42.9*** 2 -179.4 -190.5 26.1*** -180.1 -192.4 26.5***
3 -167.4 -181 38.7*** -168 -182.8 36.3*** 3 -180.5 -194.1 28.7*** -181.4 -196.2 28.3***
AT 1 -116.1 -124.2 15.7 -116.9 -126.2 14.7 AT 1 -153.4 -161.6 21.8** -154.4 -163.7 21.5**
2 -117.2 -127.7 15.8 -117.5 -129.1 13.3 2 -153.7 -164.1 16.3 -154.2 -165.8 14.3
3 -117 -129.7 15.7 -117.8 -131.7 14.5 3 -153.7 -166.5 8.75 -154.6 -168.5 9.33
LU 1 -173.8 -182.4 20.28 -174.7 -184.5 20.9* LU 1 -189.6 -198.2 19.7* -190.4 -200.3 19.7*
2 -171.1 -182.2 13 -171.8 -184.1 12.3 2 -185.4 -196.5 16.7 -186.3 -198.7 16.4
3 -172.1 -185.7 15.6 -172.9 -187.7 16.7 3 -183.2 -196.8 18.5* -184.2 -199 18.8*
Without trends With trends Without trends With trends
NSFR  and CREDIT DNSFR  and CREDIT
Note: p is the lag order for the error correction model in equation (12); AIC and SBC denote Akaike's and Schwarz's 
Bayesian Information Criteria, respectively; 2
SCx  is the maximum-likelihood test statistic for the null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
